The Central Impersonation Agency

The Company, BKHERALD, KUBARK, and several other coded, official, and unofficial names exist to describe the Central Intelligence Agency. Lurking in the shadows of clandestine operations the CIA over generations has undertaken some of the most complex impersonations and created numerous false entities or businesses to support its goals. CIA remains among the intelligence groups which possess skilled operatives that can generate deceptive credentials and identities as routine business. Yet less known are those who for a time evaded detection falsely using the name of the CIA and the operations they conducted illegally. Some of these varying people included minor intelligence assets, foreign militants, and criminals that used the Agency’s reputation to further secret enterprises and left officials deal with the ramifications.

One of the earlier instances of what officials note might become a “technical violation of impersonation statutes” involved two Cuban exiles within the American city of New Orleans during nineteen sixty-one. Manuel del Valle Caral and Julio Jane Arguida were both anti-Castro exiles used by the Central Intelligence Agency but without authorization the pair began recruiting Cuban students to join their cause. This method is similar to some of the original pro and anti-Castro groups formed in Cuba using academic cover to pursue intelligence goals. Yet these two individuals exceeded the mandate officials gave them and sought to illegally use the reputation of the US government to increase their ranks. A Federal Bureau of Investigation agent notified the FBI’s liaison with the CIA Sam Papich, Western Hemisphere Division employee Robert Wehdbee, and counterintelligence officer Jane Roman of the exile attempts.i This presents a minor example of the gray area that can develop within clandestine operations and the potential of assets using methods officials never approved. Nevertheless, illegal student recruitment was just a minor official concern, what if a person manipulated an entire group under such false pretenses for illegal acts?

The CIA would learn amongst nineteen seventy-three anti-Castro exile Guillermo J. Yglesias was financially bilking people under the pretense of government employment. Yglesias was a former member of the Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionario (Movement for the Revolutionary Recovery, MRR) a CIA funded group that in the past was given the ability to launch operations autonomously. It appears that Guillermo had decided to create his own autonomous structure to fiscally benefit himself and unknown others. The first significant lead emerged from a communication sent by Anselmo Alliegro, the nephew of Yglesias via marriage. He informed the CIA’s Domestic Contacts Division (DCD) his uncle contacted him amid early March of the same year “and stated that he worked for the United States Government, implied CIA”.ii

Guillermo told his nephew that employment for the Berwinder Corporation served as his cover and spun an elaborate tale of Watergate connected investigations freezing accounts required for secret operations. A forged or stolen document Alliegro observed purported that officials tasked “Ralph” with raising funds and officials would provide a Ponzi scheme like monthly return of ten to twenty percent for all money invested. Yglesias then asked his nephew “as an important favor to him” for a contribution “to his emergency funds.” By March 5th, 1973 Anselmo had given five thousand dollars to Guillermo’s “emergency fund” and provided a further nine hundred dollars for personal expenses. Over a month would pass and Anselmo’s investment return did materialize and by this point Yglesias had moved to a new rental home. The only way left to contact the latter was by telephone and when questions of money were discussed Anselmo was informed of a “delay in Curacao” and Yglesias deflected the questions with an offer “to work for him and his organization”. Already fifty-nine hundred dollars poorer, Alliegro informed his scheming relative he needed “some proof this was an official matter before I were to accept” due to his curiosity about what this “business actually was.”iii

First National Bank of Coral Gables CIRCA Ninteen Twenty-Six

According to Yglesias, he already had introduced his nephew to two members of his group. The first was Coral Gables First National Bank official Raul Menocal who oversaw their prior financial transaction. Another member of this supposedly backed official group was bookkeeper Urbano Anton who handled the money raised by Guillermo Yglesias. A third person identified as Luis Beltram was introduced to Anselmo and eventually referred to as “Security”, a seeming reference to a clandestine security officer. The fourth agent of this group was a middle aged man named Carlos from Puerto Rico, and the fifth member of the group he met was Jose Antonio Rodrigues Sosa. It was then a sinking feeling struck Anselmo and he realized this group was not akin to the many anti-Communist endeavors he supported but “an entirely different proposition”.

Anselmo was still provided no money as further months passed and one file notes in time Yglesias “stated the money was in no way being used for a Cuban operation” despite his nephew’s intent. Alliegro tired of Guillermo’s excuses and undertook his own investigation of the latter’s finances and organization. After contacting his uncle’s former hotel Anselmo learned his relative passed them a bad check for nineteen hundred dollars and that he owed additional funds elsewhere. A pattern of debt and false assurances was revealed and pushed Anselmo to dig further by questioning banker Raul Menocal. The bank employee disturbingly revealed he was under the assumption Guillermo “was legitimate” and working for the CIA but knew nothing of any other group.iv The betrayed nephew would proceed to visit Jose Sosa at his workplace Florida Lumber to “confirm his suspicions” and discovered Yglesias had approached the lumber worker with a similar pitch to join his group. Sosa additionally told him Anselmo himself was presented to Jose as a CIA employee to further support Guillermo’s repeated lies.

Armed with significant facts that could dispel the repeated deceptions perpetrated Anselmo went to his uncle Guillermo and demanded all of his money back. This prompted a third assurance of the money being returned after over four months had passed since it was invested without producing a cent. The money was still never received and finally Alliegro decided to contact the Central Intelligence Agency to report his uncle’s fraudulent activities. He informed Yglesias that he sought an interview with the CIA and was threatened with claims of being incriminated in related crimes or “that some terrible fate would befall him”.v It seems the younger man had finally scared the elder charlatan by involving actual government agents and prompted a death threat in return. Anselmo followed through with his intended course to alert officials and unsurprisingly his uncle’s threats were empty.

Yglesias had also simultaneously been pursuing other illegal leads to secure financial support using anti-Castro exiles. Rolando Masferrer Jr., the son of former MRR leader Rolando Masferrer Rojas, informed the Agency that Guillermo had contacted him to discuss “raising money for secret CIA operations in Latin America.”vi If he could have secured the younger Masferrer’s cooperation he might have tapped into the millions of dollars that MRR had amassed and its dozens of agents. However Rolando was unconvinced and would inform the Agency’s Miami DCD office June of the attempt falsely using the CIA’s name. This maneuver infers a boldness from Yglesias that may have been a desperate attempt to gain enough resources to escape the consequences of his other failing schemes. Yet Guillermo had several deceptive undertakings that seemed to extend beyond just taking money and greater aspirations for his group.

A COMPANY Patch Honoring Troops of Brigade 2506

The fall of nineteen seventy-three had Guillermo Yglesias approaching Antonio Eugenio Iglesias Pons, a close associate of Nicaraguan President Anastasio Samoza. Guillermo’s latest target was a former Cuban Army officer amidst the nineteen fifties who eventually became a liaison with the US Embassy and explosives expert. Antonio was among the members of the captured CIA supported Brigade 2506 following the Bay of Pigs and his brother was reportedly executed by the Castro regime. He further had developed ties with the aforementioned Nicaraguan leader and former employment with CIA that were of interest to others.vii viii Additionally, intelligence gathered by officials would place Antonio undertaking illegal anti-Castro exile operations until at least nineteen seventy-two. Guillermo approached Pons and offered employment with Belen Enterprises, a supposed front company for the CIA, located in the Floridian city of Miami. Yglesias would offer Antonio a generous salary of twelve hundred dollars monthly to have “very little to do” and he eventually realized this was due to his relationship with President Samoza. Pons was a useful contact which provided access to a world leader and his prior associations with the Agency could be used by Guillermo to offer the mask of legitimacy to fraudulent operations.

Amongst the same period Guillermo Yglesias had duped local real estate business owner Andres Castro to employ him and finance multiple fake real estate deals. Under official pretense the Agency impersonator borrowed roughly four million dollars or just over twenty-six million dollars in modern value. Using Antonio Pons they secured a one million dollar loan from the Nicaraguan government but Yglesias did not agree to use the bank foreign officials selected. Perhaps Guillermo could not launder the money received without utilizing his bank of choice and that deal fell through. Paired with the loans that would never be repaid, this eventually proved catastrophic to Castro’s business and during nineteen seventy-four he dissolved Belen Enterprises and fired its five employees.ix As the consequences mounted nearly every person beyond Guillermo's nephew still believed they had been part of CIA operations. Many who held Yglesias culpable likely still believed he was an instrument of the US government and if he would not return the stolen funds perhaps a court would.

The Agency had first learned of the peripheral CIA impersonations Guillermo Yglesias amidst the summer of nineteen seventy-three and less than two years following the matter had become a serious issue. A Miami Herald article from that spring noted Andres Castro “claims the Central Intelligence Agency was behind his selling of counterfeit mortgages” and “blamed the CIA for the failure of his mortgage business”.x Castro would name Guillermo Yglesias and Antonio Iglesias Pons amongst others as defendants but the impersonator and his former employee’s locations were then unknown. The failed business owner told the press he had provided offices to both men for over a year but what actual business they were conducting cannot be fully verified.

Prior events demonstrate that even a sometimes haphazard plot might launder millions in illegal funds for purposes unknown, influence foreign leaders, and successfully impersonate officials for more than a year without detection. Even when an intelligence group has some foreknowledge of the people and crimes involved they still require time to ascertain more information. This plodding bureaucracy failed to decisively act before the matter had exploded in the press and left them with a potential ten million dollar bill. What could a truly organized criminal group seeking to undertake greater nefarious deeds accomplish before most officials were aware they existed?
Sincerely,
C.A.A. Savastano

References:
i. Federal Bureau of Investigation, October 16, 1961, CIA Liaison Material, United States National Archives and Records Administration, NARA Identification Number: 124-90139-10121
ii. House Select Committee on Assassinations, Segregated Central Intelligence Agency File, DCD Information Report: “Guillermo Yglesias/Efforts to Raise, June 28, 1973, p. 1, The Mary Ferrell Foundation, maryferrell.org, NARA ID: 104-10071-10370
iii. Ibid, pp. 2, 3
iv. Ibid
v. Ibid, pp. 4-5
vi. Central Intelligence Agency, October 25, 1974, Speed Letter: Military Armament Cooperation, NARA ID: 104-10074-10065
vii. House Select Committee on Assassinations, August 4, 1975, FBI Subject Files, A-B, No Title, pp. 16-17, NARA ID: 124-10281-10062
viii. Ibid, p. 5
ix. Ibid, p. 19
x. CIA, Russ Holmes Work File, (n.d.), Newspaper Articles on JFK Assassination, p. 42

Related Article
The Autonomous Groups