Other Men in Mexico City II

Mexico City was the scene of Multiple unresolved allegations by the CIA, KGB, and US officials related to Lee Harvey Oswald

According to United States officials just months before they accused Lee Harvey Oswald of assassinating President John F. Kennedy he went to Mexico during the end of September. Intelligence leaders would assume these purported visits were connected to later events, despite that Oswald did not yet work at the Texas Schoolbook Depository and they neglected to account for the parade route not being established until mid-November. Without that foreknowledge provided by another party Oswald cannot perceive the endgame of all these various actions occurring later. Taken by itself the incidents in Mexico City attributed to Lee Harvey Oswald are without direct connective evidence a possible occurrence unto themselves without links to subsequent events beyond Oswald’s alleged visits. The focus of US intelligence regarding Oswald reasonably dominates most inspections but the actions of Soviet and Cuba groups regarding this peculiar historical figure are often less reviewed.   

photograph of Lee H. Oswald officials stated was attached to the Cuban Embassy application

Eyewitness statements that include Cuban Consul Eusebio Azcue stating he “would never have identified Lee Harvey Oswald as the man who visited the Cuban Consulate in 1963”, a later conversation between multiple American government leaders regarding impersonation in the same period, and further suppressed evidence infers that someone misrepresented themselves as Lee Harvey Oswald within the limits of Mexico City at least twice in one day to Cuban diplomatic employee Silvia Duran.i These appearances were undertaken by a male who was at least ten year older, shorter, had different hair and eye colors than Oswald, and this person began conflicts with multiple employees damaging any chance of Oswald gaining a visa. Additionally, this person offered illegal documents that claimed membership to a group Oswald did not when later visiting the Mexico City Cuban diplomatic compound. Repeated deviations and contending evidence significantly undermine identifying this person as Lee Harvey Oswald despite the many official assertions.

Consider the figure originally described being an “Uniden North American” on September twenty-seventh who the next day is assumed to be the official suspect conversed in “terrible, hardly recognizable Russian”. While Oswald could not read or write in Russian proficiently, he is noted by his wife and several other witnesses to speak fluent Russian years prior.ii A call made days later during October presents a male calling himself Oswald to the Soviet embassy, and spoke with embassy guard Ivan Obyedkov on the status of a visa but it again features someone who cannot speak Russian well. “Oswald” is never questioned or confronted by the embassy’s guard about allegedly barging in days before this call and bringing a gun to the embassy as multiple KGB agents would later claim. This is quite strange because later official files note that Obyedkov is security minded and he often questions any lapses in consular security.iii When this person cannot remember the name of the official dealing with them at the embassy Obyedkov volunteers the name Valeriy Kostikov, a notorious member of the KGB’s Department Thirteen responsible for sabotage and assassinations. American officials would run with this speculation for years attempting to link Oswald with Kostikov in a Soviet or Cuban plot.

surveillance photo of Valeriy Kostikov Outside the Soviet Embassy Compound in Mexico City

This purported encounter was contrived upon “Oswald” failing to know the official he met with and Obyedkov fueled endless speculations and suspicion, just as the similar alternate story of Kostikov’s occasional volleyball partner Third Secretary Nikolai Leonov did. Yet these government ideas regarding Kostikov are complicated by the fact Kostikov spoke little English, the person in these events spoke poor Russian, and Oswald could not communicate in Spanish which left no proficient mutual language for private communication. Other later evidence that was seemingly overlooked instead confirms Kostikov used coded language and met with his contacts outside the embassy because the Russians were aware of surveillance attempts by enemy groups. There are no substantial reasons to believe that Kostikov would damage his base of operations by meeting Oswald without means to properly communicate in a manner that deviates from all other meetings he undertook according to the record unless it was merely in the role of processing and photographing him to maintain his cover assignment.

Another Russian intelligence officer who supported some of the claims of related Soviet leaders was Second Secretary of the Soviet Embassy Pavel Antonvich Yatskov. He according to CIA phone tap stated “I met Oswald here. He stormed into my office and wanted me to introduce and recommend him to the Cubans…He was nervous and his hands trembled, and he stormed out of my office. I don’t believe that a person as nervous as Oswald, who hands trembled could have fired a rifle.”iv This nervous description would support the claims of other Soviet intelligence but he never mentions any threats, claims of wanting to shoot people, a date for the encounter, and the supposed gun. Most strange is while Yatskov eventually had knowledge of all these claims before his surveilled call but does not think the armed person who purportedly talked about shooting people could murder the President, unless of course there potentially never was a gun or threats. The CIA seized upon this as more confirmation of their prior assumptions but neglected to disclose the Soviets were likely aware of surveillance due to coded language used on the phones and might intentionally have misled them.    

Embassy Officer and KGB Colonel Oleg Maximovich Nechiporenko

Another Soviet intelligence source Colonel Oleg Maximovich Nechiporenko supports that Lee Oswald did venture to the embassy in that period and spoke with Kostikov briefly. Depending on which KGB officer’s version of the story you believe (Yatskov, Leonov, or Nechiporenko) they discussed Oswald’s visit and reported their impressions to Moscow but did not attempt to stop Oswald, warn the people at his hotel, or even turn the gun over as evidence. Thus, it is highly improbable but possible this person calling themselves Oswald did visit the Soviet embassy one of these days, threaten people’s lives, produce a gun, and interacted with up to four KGB agents (Yatskov, Leonov, Nechiporenko, and Kostikov) briefly attempting to gain a visa if we regard all the evidence. Nevertheless, all these assertions designed to implicate Oswald undertaking illegal actions and prevent his travel find support in KGB personnel because American officials just accepted incongruent stories to assume Oswald is responsible by the very Soviets seeking to obstruct their operations. Notably the Agency disagreed with following Russian and Cuban government related pronouncements stating their investigations believed the CIA was involved in President Kennedy’s assassination likely because it did not implicate just Oswald.v

Third Secretary and KGB officer Nikolai Sergeyevich Leonov

Conversely, perhaps much of these events were fabricated by the KGB to foil a security threat and mislead American intelligence groups due to Nechiporenko’s full claims emerging decades later in a book naming Oswald as part of a conspiracy and Leonov’s account did not appear for decades as well in a Russia state media outlet. Notably the improbable events at the Soviet embassy include a mixture of widely diverging people undertaking the same largely unbelievable actions without regular consequences. American officials noted according to the Mexican newspaper Excelsior, Oswald had returned to the Soviet embassy and created a similar argument to the one a day prior in September at the Cuban embassy, yet they fail to regard other myths about Oswald’s time in Mexico City from the same media source asserting a Cuban plot. The Soviet visit is also supported by a translated Agency document states that Silvia Duran called the Soviet embassy prior to the “Oswald” visit later that day. Yet that person identified is the one from the day before that did not match Oswald’s speech or appearance, similar to the phone call, and thus we must assume it is Oswald despite the facts or consider it was the same person calling themselves Oswald. Perhaps if this impersonator was a member of Russian intelligence, they might just craft the erratic pistol wielding Oswald story to augment the prior damage and with aid from other aligned intelligence officers. Only the speculations of a questionable newspaper, KGB offered statements, and the assumptions of United States intelligence present this person was Lee Harvey Oswald.

Witness Silvia Duran, that officials seem only to rely upon when she conforms to portions of their claims, told investigators she “adamantly denies that Oswald or any other American visited the Cuban Consulate on Saturday September 28, 1963.”vi According to one file Mexican politician Luis Echevarria told Agency Station Chief Winston Scott that Duran was cooperative and offered a statement in November of that same year attesting “two visits by Oswald”, not over two days, but two visits.vii While some officials doubted her and called her a liar when she deviated from their narrative, other subsequent investigators stated “there are indications that she was truthful when she stated that Oswald did not visit The Consulate on September 28…(the) conversation was linked to Oswald because of the marginal notations”.viii Further, CIA assets had falsely disparaged Duran repeatedly by attempting to link her to Oswald following Mexico City station’s considering her recruitment. This same person claimed to be a Communist, something Oswald publicly stated he was not, does not know Oswald’s address and had to return to the Cuban embassy to retrieve it. Unsurprisingly what possible assistance contained in tapes or photography that American officials might contribute were claimed destroyed by multiple sources on different occasions.

Several pieces of evidence and information support the KGB had advance notice that a Cold War defector and his wife sought to return to Russia because of their past repeated letters to Russian officials. September twenty-seventh a person sought to upend any chances Oswald could venture to Cuba or Russia by causing problems with Cuban government representatives, the next day this armed person who spoke broken Russian would allegedly visit the Soviet Embassy and repeat the episode with KGB agents that did little beyond calm him down. Days later the Obyedkov call at the Embassy on the first day of October features a person speaking broken Russian calling themselves Oswald who states they were “a day or so” ago present but the embassy guard does not question them about this visit or even ask if they were person who produced a gun. The CIA assumed this person was Oswald based on transcription notes that claimed this voice matched a former caller with a similar voice at the Cuban consulate speaking broken Russian and then added what details Soviet and Cuban intelligence offered to construct their best guess. Yet there is no reason to assume this is Lee Oswald because of the broken Russian, the diverging physical and behavioral details of witnesses at the Cuban embassy prior, multiple eyewitness statements, and no substantial evidence that ties him to several visits over varying dates.

Oswald’s actions, what actions he did take, the possible manipulation by outside people, and his desire to return to the Soviet Union presented a reasonable security threat or opportunity to Russian intelligence. Were any members of foreign intelligence who later seemingly created unlikely accounts regarding Oswald molding him into an unstable threat in order to neutralize any security dangers he presented without understanding his future importance? According to at least one Soviet official the events of Mexico City did not just prevent Oswald from returning to Russia but his wife as well. Perhaps the actions of several intelligence groups each with their own designs have prevented greater understanding of these competing webs of influence and why people could potentially manipulate the facts about Lee Harvey Oswald in Mexico City.
Sincerely,
C.A.A. Savastano

References:
i. Assassinations Records Review Board, Electronic Records, Files of Michelle M Seguin, Analyst, Lopez Report, (n.d.), p. 205
ii. Central Intelligence Agency, Russ Holmes Work File, Overview of Mexico City Photo Ops with Chronology, 28 September 1963 (Saturday), (n.d.), National Archives and Records Administration Number: 104-10413-10000
iii. CIA, File on Obyedkov, Ivan Dmitriyevich, Dispatch to Chief of Soviet Branch, February 27, 1971, NARA ID: 104-10177-10224 
iv. House Select Committee on Assassinations, Segregated CIA file, Leads investigated by CIA, 2 July 1964 Box 34, August 26, 1964, NARA ID: 1993.07.20.08.53:33:500530 
v. HSCA, Seg. CIA file, Silvia Duran at Cuban Embassy called Soviet Consul RE North American, November 23, 1963, p. 1, NARA ID: 1993.97.06.17:29:10:310150
vi. AARB, Electronic Records, Lopez.01, Files of Executive Director and General Counsel T. Jeremy Gunn, Lee Harvey Oswald, The CIA, And Mexico City, (n.d.), p. 247
vii. HSCA, Seg. CIA file, Personal information taken from Silvia Tirado Bozan de Duran, Box 34, August 26, 1964, p. 9, NARA: 1993.07.20.08:50:25:620530
viii. HSCA, Seg. CIA file, Staff Notes, Analysis of Lee Harvey Oswald’s Activities in Mexico City, 1978, p. 265, NARA ID: 180-10142-10167

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